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Abstract—In the last few years, the amount of smart devices in 
domestic environments has incredibly increased. Nowadays, a 
smart home is usually managed via a gateway offering value-
added applications by connecting devices to the cloud. Every new 
device comes with its own features and protocols or cloud 
services. There is, consequently, a strong need for constantly 
modifying the gateway’s behavior by deploying, removing or 
updating applications. However, there is no software architecture 
ensuring enough flexibility and trust to sustain this need. We 
consequently propose in this article a framework that allows to 
easily compose modular and context-aware software 
architectures intending to host third-party applications. This 
framework – called AOLOA (Another OSGi-Like On Another) – is 
based on OSGi and Java permissions. It ensures applications 
isolation, separates business-logic (higher level) and platform 
(lower level) layers and allows their trusted management.  
Service-Oriented Computing, Ubiquitous Computing, Security, 
Software Isolation, OSGi, Java Security  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The next section introduces the context of our work and 
discusses its motivations.  
A. Context 
Our home is where most of our ubiquitous computing [1] 
experience takes place. The smart devices we bring (such as 
phones, watches or glasses) meet those already populating our 
home (like tablets, connected TVs or sensors) as well as the 
cloud, in order to offer us more and more connected services. 
Our home is smart enough to take decisions without us when 
we are out, but most often it lets us have remote control.  
These services are usually orchestrated by a gateway, 
connected to the cloud and to our devices, hosting services that 
act as glue between them and where we can define context-
aware behaviors. 
Designing such gateways is not an issue, but performing 
this task becomes much more complicated when dynamism   
becomes a major concern. Existing software architectures 
already allow dynamically deploying or removing third-party 
applications (like Android, OpenHAB [2] or HomeOS [3]). 
These applications are generally made of software services, 
following the Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) principles. 
In some cases, applications are provided from remote 
repositories in a "Foo-store" manner (like Android or iOS). 
However, these platforms are assumed to be used in a 
particular context (protocols, devices …) and consequently rely 
on a prebuilt and unmodifiable basis. Android, for example, 
considers only a predefined set of sensors/actuators and 
network interfaces. Taking into account a new sensor 
consequently implies updating the entire operating system. 
As presented in Figure 1, home gateways traditionally 
distinguish several actors, with different roles: 
 the Gateway Owner (GO) who is the resident and 
gateway's main end-user; 
 the Gateway Provider (GP) who delivers the gateway 
to the GO; 
 Applications Providers (AP) who design third-party 
applications and make them remotely available on 
applications stores (GPs can also be APs). 
Services are often considered as building blocks of larger 
logical units called components. Components may provide 
several services and reciprocally require services provided by 
other components. Applications can then be considered as 
assemblies of components. Services running on gateways can 
be distinguished with regards to two major concerns. On one 
hand, technical services aim at providing hardware or 
communications abstractions (device drivers, network 
protocols …) as well as utility or administration features 
(logging, persistency, back-end …). On the other hand, 
business services embody the application’s logic behavior. 
B. Motivations and approach 
Home gateways deserve better customizability. Our 
motivations are to enhance home gateways flexibility in order 
to make them as reusable as possible. In this article, we only 
focus on service-oriented gateways.  
As previously said, services have different concerns. 
Technical services take place at a platform level, whose goal 
should be to customize the bare service runtime in order to take 
into account specific application domain and hardware. From a 
minimalistic point of view, GPs could deliver blank gateways, 
with a platform nevertheless tailored to their domain and 
hardware requirements. Business services, on the opposite, take 
place at an (upper) application level, and should allow 
customizing the platform for a specific use. This customization 
could ideally be done by the GO by deploying (and further 
updating/removing) third-party applications from remote 
stores. It is also conceivable that the platform level could also 
be partly customized by the GO (by GP delegation) or by an 
autonomic manager [4][5]. 
This customization makes more sense only if business and 
technical components’ lifecycle can also be easily and 
dynamically managed. Nevertheless, because of the cost of 
such gateways as well as their energy consumption having to 
 
remain low, the underlying software architecture must match 
classical embedded devices’ footprints (typically, those of a 
Raspberry Pi or equivalent). 
 
Figure 1.  System actors 
Finally, allowing third-party services to co-exist on top of a 
customizable basis, as well as allowing the end-user to deploy 
technical or business services, requires addressing some issues 
with regards to security and safety. As illustrated on Figure 1, 
our approach thus consists in clearly distinguishing the 
platform and applications layers, isolating services execution, 
and controling administration-related actions with roles and 
permissions. This approach is detailed in section III, after 
having presented some related work. Before concluding and 
drawing the lessons learned from our experiments, we 
introduce a reference implementation for the framework in 
section IV. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Our work is an architectural solution that addresses various 
research domains, mainly isolation and security. Note that our 
framework – called AOLOA – aims at building a customized 
platform for a specific context. Consequently, some approaches 
cited in this related work section can be used in addition to our 
framework. 
It is possible to classify “isolation” according to four layers 
that we further use to reference some relevant works. 
 Service isolation (a usage scope of services), for 
example OSGi service Hook (cf. [6] pp.353-366) or 
Region subsystem (cf. [7] pp. 557-616) 
 Class isolation (a use scope of classes) that can consist 
in import-export mechanism between class loaders (as 
in OSGi), in hiding packages for one or several groups 
(i.e. Bundle Hook (cf. [6] pp. 345-352), Region 
subsystem (cf. [7] pp. 557-616)), or in embedding 
systems in other ones (i.e.: Region or V-OSGi [8]). 
 Process isolation (threads’ execution separated in 
different system processes) requires in practice 
modifying the virtual machine in order to implement it. 
This is the case of I-JVM [9][10]. 
 Virtual Machine isolation, where applications and 
platform are hosted in different virtual machines is, 
here, a conceptual nonsense. 
Our work can be seen as the continuation of [8]. In short, 
Virtual OSGi (V-OSGi) allows creating several application 
layers for a multiple-stakeholder context. In [11], authors 
blame that their work does not really address the problem of 
isolation for multi-stakeholder issues. This lack has motivated 
the I-JVM project (process isolation) [10]. Indeed, OSGi does 
not define any “process isolation” although it is required for 
multi-stakeholder. However, it is not an issue in our context 
where there is only one stakeholder, only one “owner”, and 
some third-party applications which can be forced by security.  
Concerning security issues, the framework proposed in this 
article is easily customizable, connected, and the dynamism 
and sharing mechanisms involve “some” complexity. In short, 
as discussed in [12], security for such a framework is essential, 
but also more complicated to implement. In this article, G. 
McGraw and G. Morrisett expose a methodology and 
classifications of attacks and solutions to establish the system 
security. Following [12] and [13], we have improved the 
security mechanisms of the AOLOA framework. Indeed, as 
explained above, we have similarities with the Android system: 
providing a platform, hosting third-party applications and 
provisioning through repositories/stores. Despite the fact that 
Android runs over a Unix system, it does not base this security 
on it, but on two main mechanisms: applications identification 
associated to a permissions list (IBAC) and (process) isolation 
maintained between applications and platform. All 
communications pass through the platform that checks through 
the ICC level. However, and also the platform dynamic 
management, in AOLOA – that are based on OSGi – 
applications can directly communicate with each other, but 
they must declare authorization to reach each other. This 
approach is also similartothe security-by-contract [14][15]. 
However, in the future, it will certainly be necessary to 
intercept communications to log and verify their content. 
III. A CUSTOMIZABLE PLATFORM FOR THIRD-PARTY 
APPLICATIONS 
To sum up our motivations, the framework enhancing 
gateway customizability must: 
 allow dynamically deploying and managing technical 
components on the platform layer; 
 allow dynamically deploying and managing business 
components – which can be provided by third-party 
companies – on the applications layer from the 
platform; 
 provide a mechanism to share targeted technical 
services with the business components of the 
applications layer. 
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The framework also has to take into account the following 
constraints: 
 it must secure the execution environment from 
malicious actions coming from the applications layer; 
 it must prevent and protect the platform from errors 
and faults originating from the applications layer; 
 it should be resource-friendly. 
This section briefly discusses the minimal targeted 
hardware before introducing our approach with regards to 
safety and security, as well as their impact on software 
architecture. Finally, it details the deployment unit’s life-cycle. 
A. Targeted hardware 
Dynamism is a main concern in our approach, as 
deployment and management of both applications and platform 
could be done “on the fly”. However, deployment and dynamic 
binding usually rely on either interpreted languages or virtual 
machines (HomeOS[3], OSGi[6], Kevoree[16]). Our approach 
thus considers using an embedded platform able at least of 
hosting a virtual machine. In our experimentations, we have 
been using a Raspberry Pi model B
1
. 
B. Security and safety mechanisms 
Obviously, the Gateway Provider cannot trust third party 
application providers. An application can indeed be badly 
implemented or malicious. The framework must consequently 
have safety and security mechanisms: safety to prevent and 
protect the platform layer from faults originating from 
applications, security in order to block malicious actions. To 
ensure these properties, our framework relies on isolation and 
access control. 
1) Isolation 
As mentioned in the related work section, isolation 
mechanisms can be basically classified according to several 
layers: object/class isolation where it must not be possible 
respectively for an object/class to access to another object/class 
outside of its usage scope; process isolation where threads can 
be separated and isolated in different system processes; and 
finally Virtual Machine isolation where applications are 
executed in different virtual machines. 
It is, here, a conceptual nonsense to isolate the platform 
layer and the applications layer in two virtual machines (not to 
mention the strong impact on performance). Process isolation 
offers a great isolation between layers running in the same VM. 
However, it supposes that the VM supports it and that is not the 
case for the classical Java or .Net VMs. Our technological 
choices – discussed in the section IV – imply using the Java 
VM. Consequently, implementing process isolation requires to 
modify the VM for each gateway. It is not consistent with our 
goal of alleviating the burden of the gateway provider when 
designing platforms.  
We consequently focus on the classes and objects isolation. 
In opposition to [10][11], the gateway provider is, in our 
execution context, responsible for the platform layer while the 
gateway owner is responsible for the applications layer. As 
there is no multi-stakeholder, process isolation is consequently 
not mandatory. This isolation mechanism can be implemented 
by simulating several execution spaces where shared resources 
                                                          
1
 http://www.raspberrypi.org/ 
must seem stateless and private resources must be hidden (cf. 
[7] pp. 557-616). It can also be implemented by truly 
separating execution spaces. The latter approach simplifies 
security management and allows defining platform and 
application with few side effects. Although classes and objects 
are isolated between both layers, the framework provides a 
mechanism to export packages and services. 
2) Security 
We identified three angles of attack in the proposed 
framework (cf. locks of the Figure 1): 
 Malicious access made from the web administration 
(apps and platform) interface; 
 Malwares contained by corrupted components coming 
from unofficial (considered unsecured) repositories; 
 Data collection and malicious behavior from an 
“official” signed component. 
The subsection I.B has underlined three “roles” (apps user, 
gateway owner, gateway provider) and three “uses” (use apps, 
manage apps and manage platform). The table below sums up 
“uses” authorized for each of the roles. To prevent attacks 
through the web administration interface, the framework 
should have a RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) [17] 
mechanism that applies on all administration operations. 
TABLE I.  ROLE/USE MATRIX 
  Authentication required 
 Locally use 
apps 
Manage Apps 
Manage 
Platform 
User Yes  No 
Owner Yes Limited by the 
provider 
Provider Limited Yes 
 
It is necessary to scan (cf. “Scanning for Known Malicious 
Code” section of [12]) potentially corrupted components before 
their installation. Generally, this scan is made when 
components are pushed to the official repository. However, if 
the gateway owner deploys from an unofficial repository, the 
framework integrity can be broken. Consequently, the 
installation mechanism should scan components after their 
transfer and before their installation. 
Finally, the main security issue is to execute (without trust) 
third-party applications. Indeed, an application downloaded 
from an “official” repository does generally what it was 
intended to do. But sometimes, it has malicious behavior (in 
general, stealing users’ information). Identifying malicious 
applications is more complicated because they do not 
necessarily have virus signature (detected by scan) and they do 
what they say they do. To detect them, it is necessary to have 
two mechanisms: resources access control and communications 
log. 
The applications layer must perform access control on 
every resource in the execution environment. This access 
control is based on permissions declared by each business 
component (indeed, the gateway provider cannot define it a 
priori and exhaustively). Consequently, each business 
component must declare every access to framework resources: 
classes, business and technical services, files, system 
properties… It must also declare which of its resources could 
further be used by other components: business services, 
 
packages… Unspecified actions are automatically denied (file 
access, life-cycle change, socket access…). This list is provided 
to the deployer (GO or GP) that can dynamically grant or reject 
all or part of them. Thus, permission management of IBAC 
(Identity-Based Access Control) type is delegated to the 
deployer. Conversely, a business component can provide 
business services that want to restrict the use to a subset of 
business component always running on platform. For that, it 
should provide rules or signatures that the components must 
provide to use it: it is the purpose of security-by-contract 
[14][15]. 
Communication protocols (from/to outside) must be 
provided and controlled (logged) by the platform layer. 
If these mechanisms are implemented, and thanks to the 
isolation between both layers, the platform layer can then be 
considered as a DMZ (DeMilitarized Zone). Consequently, 
installation and execution of technical components, usually 
managed by the gateway provider, no longer require any 
particular access control because they share the same level of 
trust. Then, the composition and management of the platform 
layer are simplified. However, as the platform layer can export 
some technical services and consequently share the associated 
classes, our framework must also isolate exported services, 
classes and classloaders. In our case, it is done through the use 
of proxies and temporary classloaders. 
C. Deployment-unit concepts  
In this article, we abusively use the word component to 
refer to the deployment unit (the atomic element to transfer). 
Indeed, a “true” component-model will further be defined and 
considered as an overlay of our framework because it is 
domain-specific. The only paradigm imposed by our 
framework is that platform and applications should be built on 
top of the SOA (Service-Oriented Architecture) of each layer. 
Thanks to SOA’s loose coupling, the dynamic reconfiguration 
of layers is eased. 
Life-cycle operations that apply to these components are 
currently the classic ones: transfer into the framework, loading, 
activation, deactivation, unloading, updating and removal. 
However, the isolation and security mechanisms impact the 
components life-cycle. Thus, a business component must 
declare the permissions to access resources. 
The following example is further used to explain these 
mechanisms. 
The purpose of this application example is to monitor 
ambient inside and outside temperatures and to notify an alert 
via emails when these temperatures exceed a predefined 
threshold. As shown in Figure 2, this application is composed 
of five deployment-units: 
 SMTP-Client Service (MS) provides a service which 
allows receiving and sending emails using an IMAP 
mail server account. 
 Sensors Discovery Service (DS) provides a service 
which allows registering a handler for each sensor type 
to receive their notifications. This service embeds a 
plug and play protocol such as UPnP or DPWS that 
interfaces a business-oriented overlay for these sensors.  
 HTTP Service provides a service through which it is 
possible to register HTTP servlets to an embedded 
HTTP server. 
 Aggregator Service (AS) aims at aggregating data 
coming from sensors and sending alert email when a 
predefined threshold is passed. For that, it provides a 
service which allows configuring the email account of 
the sender as well as that of the receiver. This service 
also allows configuring the inside and outside 
temperature threshold and getting the current 
temperature. Consequently, it uses MS and DS. 
 SenseUI Service is the Web interface (Servlet) enabling 
AS access. So, it uses the AS service. 
 
Figure 2.  Application example using AOLOA 
In this example the Aggregator Service (AS) requires the 
Discovery Service (DS) and the SMTP Client Service (MS), and 
provides a service used by the SenseUI graphical interface. 
The AS must consequently declare three requirements to 
both get and register these services. It must also provide a 
capability that defines the permission required to use its 
service. Finally, the AS must declare, with the same logic, 
provided and required packages. 
We have generalized the approach through the following 
model (cf. Figure 3):  
 
Figure 3.  Deployment-Unit security model 
 A deployment-unit provides capabilities (provided 
resources) and has requirements (required resources) 
to/from the execution environment. 
 A capability is a resource provided by the deployment-
unit. It is defined by its type (for example: service, 
event, data), the name of the targeted resource and the 
location or the signature of the deployment-unit 
authorized to use it. If neither the signature nor the 
location is specified, everyone is authorized to use it. 
 A requirement is a required resource. It is defined by 
the type of the targeted resource, the target of the 
permission, the actions on the resource, and the fact 
that the requirement is optional or not (deployment-
unit can be started without this resource).  
These permissions are checked by the framework and 
prompted to the deployer (gateway owner), who might have to 
 
validate them (or not). This step implies adding a specific state 
in the deployment-unit life-cycle. 
D. Deployment Unit Life-cycle 
The deployment-unit life-cycle that applies to the 
applications layer has the seven following states (cf. Figure 4): 
 
Figure 4.  Business deployment-unit life-cycle 
 Installed: The deployment unit is installed: the transfer 
has been done and it is ready to load. 
 Waiting for validation: This state means that the 
deployment unit is frozen until its deployer accepts or 
rejects the set of required permissions. 
 Loaded: This state means that the permissions have 
been checked and the classes and static resources 
(pictures…) have been loaded in the layer. At this 
state, the deployment-unit is ready to start. 
 Starting: It is a transition state between the loaded and 
the active states, where the notifications are sent and 
the context of the deployment unit is initialized.  
 Active: This state means that the deployment-unit, 
which was in the “starting” state, has been started and 
is now running. 
 Stopping: During this state, notifications of the 
termination are sent. When the stop and underlying 
operations are processed, the deployment-unit returns 
to the loaded state. 
 Uninstalled: The deployment-unit is uninstalled.  
The deployment unit life-cycle in the platform layer has (cf. 
Figure 5) the Installed, Loaded, Starting, Active, Stopping 
and Uninstalled states previously defined for the applications 
layer.  
However, it also has the Exported state. Indeed, once the 
deployment-unit is started and active, the framework checks 
whether resources must be exported to the applications layer. If 
the applications layer is started and if related exports have been 
made, the deployment unit then moves to the “exported” state.  
 
Figure 5.  Technical deployment-unit life-cycle 
If the applications layer is stopped, then the deployment 
unit comes back to the “active” state. 
As suggested by the “exported” state, the applications layer 
itself has a lifecycle. Indeed, any modification in the platform 
layer may require the restarting of the applications layer. It is 
also possible to shut down the applications layer if there is no 
third-party application running. 
Consequently, the applications layer’s life-cycle (cf. Figure 
6) has three states: 
 
Figure 6.  Applications layer’s life-cycle 
 Active: the applications layer is started and 
operational; 
 Destroyed: the applications layer has been stopped, 
and all references to it have been released; 
 Should be reloaded: a modification in the framework 
may require restarting the applications layer. It is up to 
the platform layer to decide when it is appropriate to 
operate this restart. 
E. Synthesis 
Our main objective is to give to the gateway provider the 
ability to design, deploy and dynamically manage its platform 
as a classic modular application-based service, where the life-
cycle of applications is ruled by security mechanisms and the 
life-cycle of the platform itself.  
There are three main concerns in the proposed framework: 
 Security: inherent in the third-party applications 
hosting; 
 Dynamic management: inherent in a constantly varying 
open environment; 
 Resource-friendly: related to the economical aspect of 
technology adoption. 
In this approach, technical components (cf. Figure 7) aim 
either at providing services and features for business 
components (like device communication protocols or remote 
services), or at refining and controlling both the platform’s and 
applications’ life-cycles. 
For example, a technical component exposes a service to 
drive the house’s HVAC, while a business component (cf. 
Figure 7) uses it to regulate inside temperature. Classes 
required to use services are shared with the applications layer, 
and service objects are exported/registered in the applications 
layer.  
A modification (install, removal…) in the applications layer 
does not impact the platform layer. The reciprocity is false, the 
applications’ life-cycle being linked to the platform’s life-
cycle. Consequently, a change occurring in the platform may 
have an impact on the application life-cycle. This is the case, 
for example, when a business component using a technical 
service or a technical API must be updated. 
Both the security mechanisms (IBAC for the third-party 
applications, RBAC for the administration and “scan” before 
install) and the isolation mechanism finally allow considering 
 
the platform layer as a DMZ. It consequently facilitates the 
composition and the management of the platform by the 
gateway provider. 
 
Figure 7.  Framework architecture 
IV. AOLOA IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTATIONS 
In this section, we firstly describe our technical solution. 
Then, we introduce some execution metrics gathered from 
experiments on a PC and a Raspberry Pi Model B.  
A. Technical solution 
The AOLOA framework – for Another OSGi-Like On 
Another – is developed in Java-SE6 and uses the Felix OSGi 
implementation to develop both platform and applications 
layers. Security mechanisms are implemented by using the 
Felix security bundle (PermissionAdmin). AOLOA framework 
combines the OSGi and Java permissions and extends the 
OSGi bundle life-cycles for the both layers.  
 
Figure 8.  AOLOA framework launch hierarchy 
AOLOA is currently (version 1.2.4) available
2
, but some 
features are only partially implemented or unavailable. The 
current version has 8004 lines of code (obtained with sonar 
tool
3
) for 91 classes and 32 packages and dispatched in 6 
modules (Classic Jar and Bundles). The unit test coverage of 
the core (excluding shell and GUI) is 46% (51,2% for the lines 
and 34,5% for the branches). 
These 6 modules are: 
 aoloa-security-maven-plugin is a maven plugin to 
generate security permissions used for the application 
layer. This plugin uses the maven-bundle-plugin 
properties and declared metadata (for example an 
access permission to a file) to generate the list required 
by the business component to be executed. The 
following snippet has been generated – with this plugin 
– in the Aggregator Service manifest from the maven-
bundle-plugin information. 
required-permissions: 
[…].AdminPermission\$this\listener,metadata; 
[…].ServicePermission\fr.lcis.ctsys.aoloa.services.discov
ery.demo.service.api.ServicesPublicationService\get; 
[…].ServicePermission\fr.lcis.ctsys.aoloa.demo.alert.mail
.sender.api.AlertMailSenderService\get; 
[…].ServicePermission\fr.lcis.ctsys.aoloa.demo.aggregator
.DataAggregatorService\register; 
[…].PackagePermission\org.osgi.framework\import; 
... 
[…].PackagePermission\fr.lcis.ctsys.aoloa.demo.aggregator
\exportonly,import; 
 aoloa-bootstrap initializes the boot classloader to 
share a static and unique API and libraries for the 
different framework layers (cf. Figure 9). This module 
is the environment launcher and allows starting and 
stopping the platform layer (aoloa-platform-launcher) 
(cf. Figure 8). 
 
Figure 9.  AOLOA Classloader architecture 
 aoloa-platform-launcher initializes a classloader used 
to launch an OSGi implementation (platform layer) – 
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here org.apache.felix – and provides two services: one 
to manage (cf. Figure 6) the applications layer (aoloa-
apps-launcher) and export packages and services, 
another to manage (cf. Figure 4) the bundles from the 
applications layer. 
 Aoloa-apps-launcher initializes a classloader allowing 
delegating some packages to the bundle from the 
platform layer (cf. Figure 9). This classloader is used to 
launch another Felix for the applications layer where 
the felix.security component runs (cf. Figure 8). 
 aoloa-platform-command and aoloa-visu are 
respectively a Java Swing GUI and a Web-GUI used to 
manage both the application and the platform layers. 
The AOLOA framework combines a classic classloader 
hierarchy with the classloader delegation network from OSGi 
(cf. Figure 9). It allows launching two distinct OSGi 
frameworks in a same classloader and shares packages and 
services from the platform layer to the applications layer. 
B. Metrics 
We have extracted some metrics from the current 
implementation of AOLOA. These metrics are:  
 the starting time (ST) for the boot, the platform layer 
and the applications layer;  
 the framework memory footprint (MF) (used memory 
is raised after a garbage collector execution at the 
starting  and when the initialization is done). 
The procedure to gather these metrics is classic: the 
framework is launched 100 times, the 10 min and 10 max 
values are removed, and the result is the average value. 
This procedure has been performed both on a laptop (Dell 
Latitude E6420, Windows 7, Oracle JDK1.6.0_35) and on a 
Raspberry Pi (Model B, Raspbian, Open JDK 1.6.0_27). 
TABLE II.  EXECUTION METRICS 
 Dell Latitude 
E6420 
Raspberry Pi Model 
B 
Boot ST  36ms 581ms 
Platform ST 543ms 7524ms 
Applications ST 321ms 9883ms 
Framework MF 2,78Mo NC 
The framework memory footprint is not communicated 
because it seems wrong (>0,4Mo). We currently cannot explain 
why the platform layer starts faster than the applications layer 
on the laptop and inversely for the Raspberry Pi (CPU 
instruction? JDK?...); this issue will be analyzed further. 
C. Experimentation 
To experiment the AOLOA features, we have developed 
the “ambient temperatures monitoring” application described 
previously (cf. subsection III.C ). In the initial case, the HTTP 
service and the AOLOA Visualization service (web 
administration interface) were pre-installed on the platform-
layer. By the way of the Visualization, the Services Discovery 
Service (based on an ad’hoc discovery protocols) and the 
SMTP mail service were installed and started into the platform 
layer. Next, the Aggregator Service and the SenseUI service 
were installed. However, and in opposition to the technical 
services, we were prompted during their installation to validate 
the resources’ access permissions. The gateway administration 
service has alerted about the fact that the AS requires to bind to 
both the DS and MS services. Once the permissions have been 
granted, the AS service has been started properly. The same 
permissions granting step has occurred while installing the 
SenseUI service and before it turns active. Once the application 
has been activated and operational, the previous services have 
been stopped and uninstalled. 
This scenario has been considered as an acceptance testing. 
These experiments allowed us to underline a set of theoretical 
and technical problems, most of which are discussed in the 
following section. 
V. LESSON LEARNED AND ROADMAP 
Since AOLOA is still under development, some features are 
not yet totally implemented. This is particularly the case for the 
capabilities, where only requirements are yet developed. 
However, through the different experimentations, we have 
learned the following lessons. 
A. Theoretical issues 
The motivation of security in a dynamic and open context is 
easy to understand. In opposition, its effective implementation 
is extremely complicated. In a first step, the “attack endpoints” 
of the system must be identified and typed. Then, for each of 
them, well-known mechanisms can be applied. A formal 
verification could be performed to check the closure of the 
system. However, the platform running on AOLOA is not 
predefined and the deployer must validate (or not) the security 
permission applying to the third-party applications. A major 
problem occurs with the last point: the end user is prompted. 
Indeed, he does not necessarily have the security skills and so 
he can compromise the integrity of the security system (e.g.: in 
authorizing writing to file system or Java reflection). One of the 
questions we have been asking ourselves for some time: should 
we protect the user from himself? And in such case, how? 
B. Technical issues 
AOLOA was designed and developed from the OSGi 
specifications in hoping to be able to substitute the OSGi 
framework implementations (e.g.: Felix, Equinox or mBS of 
PROSYST). Although OSGi standardizes a way to launch the 
OSGi framework allowing embedding it in another framework; 
this does not mean that the OSGi implementations and their 
“official” bundles take it into account. We have identified 
technical problems while using the Felix OSGi 
implementation; especially the two mentioned below. 
AOLOA uses the framework bundle context from the 
applications layer to delegate on the other bundle from the 
platform layer, in substituting its classloader parent with ours. 
Of course, we check that the desired class belongs to an 
exported package, and that the application has the required 
permissions. However – for some reason we have not yet 
identified – the context used for permissions is not the 
application’s, and therefore it does not have permission (in the 
experiments). 
The second problem is related to the persistence of states 
when the platform restarts: some components can be restarted 
before the end of the AOLOA security mechanism initialization 
and consequently have an unsafe behavior. 
 
In these two cases, we have found a “neat” solution, that 
requires changing the source code of the OSGi implementation 
(here Felix) and a “dirty” one (costly in terms of performance 
and bad in terms of software engineering in comparison with 
the “neat” one), but that does not require changing the source 
code. 
C. Roadmap 
In parallel with the previous technical and theoretical 
problem resolution, we will begin the following roadmaps: one 
that could be named “engineering” (that we must deal with in 
the case of industrial partnerships) and the other one being 
more “research-related”. 
In the “engineering” roadmap, we must develop the Web 
administration interface with a Role-Based Access Control, and 
a repository with the associated client pro-active in the 
malicious code detection. 
In the case of the “research” roadmap, we should study the 
“real” component models like SCA [18], Blueprint [19] or 
iPOJO [20] and the associated security.  
Finally, once we have all these bricks, we will finally 
address the autonomic management for the platform and the 
applications, and the active analysis of the security logs. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVE 
The approach proposed in this article aims at providing a 
composable framework dedicated to host third-party context-
aware applications on gateways. Existing software 
architectures already allow dynamically deploying or removing 
third-party applications. However, they generally assume being 
used in a particular domain and so rely on a prebuilt basis. The 
number of possible domains is wide. Consequently, our goal is 
to provide a generic basis that allows to quickly and easily 
compose a domain-specific platform. 
The proposed framework is composed of two layers: one to 
define and manage the domain-specific platform and the 
second to deploy and run third-party applications. The platform 
layer allows managing the applications layer and sharing 
resources (classes, services…) with it. Consequently, Security 
and isolation are two major concerns.  
Users do not trust third-party applications that are 
dynamically installed. When a deployment unit is to be 
installed, the framework has to check the declared security 
permissions and delegate the acceptance or the rejection of all 
or part of these permissions to the deployer.  
On the other side, the framework ensures isolation, 
forbidding access to resources that are not to be shared between 
both layers and to limiting the side effects. Layers are isolated 
thanks to a combination of a classical Java classloader 
hierarchy and OSGi classloader delegations networks. 
This approach has led to the development of the AOLOA 
framework (An OSGi-Like On Another) based on Java6 and 
OSGi (Felix implementation). To validate it, an “ambient 
temperatures monitoring” example has been developed and 
rolled out over a PC and a Raspberry Pi. 
Although our approach is still incomplete, initial 
experiments are quite encouraging, pushing us to continue 
established roadmaps. 
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